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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
CONF

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14 OCT 1970

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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

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14 OCTOBER 1970
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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 5 - 11 OCTOBER 1970

Moscow (4023 items)

Brezhnev's 2 October Speech, Baku	(8%)	8%
Middle East	(25%)	8%
[Soviet Foreign Ministry Statement	(--)	3%]
[Nasir Death	(19%)	2%]
GDR National Day	(--)	7%
Pompidou in USSR	(0.5%)	7%
Indochina	(3%)	7%
[Nixon Speech	(--)	3%]
Gus Hall's 60th Birthday	(--)	3%
DPRK Workers Party 25th Anniversary	(--)	3%
Luna 16	(7%)	3%
China	(8%)	2%

Peking (3257 items)

PRC National Day	(49%)	44%
[Foreign Greetings & Observances	(22%)	36%]
[Joint Editorial	(5%)	3%]
[Lin Piao Speech	(4%)	3%]
Other Domestic Issues	(15%)	22%
Indochina	(2%)	11%
[Cambodian Republic	(--)	3%]
[Nixon Speech	(--)	2%]
[DRV Economic Delegation in PRC	(--)	2%]
DPRK Workers Party 25th Anniversary	(--)	3%
Nasir Death	(5%)	3%
Couve de Murville in PRC	(--)	2%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

President Nixon's 7 October five-point proposal on Indochina, including the call for immediate negotiations for a cease-fire in place and the immediate release of prisoners, drew prompt comment from the communist delegates at Paris as well as in routine Hanoi and Front propaganda. High-level official reaction comes belatedly in a DRV Foreign Ministry statement, carried by VNA on 14 October, which declares that "the Vietnamese people and the government of the DRV sternly condemn and categorically reject" the Nixon Administration's "deceptive 'peace' proposal." The statement also sharpens earlier comment when it says: "So long as the U.S. imperialists continue to actively implement their aggressive schemes and refuse to announce a timetable for total withdrawal of U.S. troops from the Indochinese nations, and so long as they refuse to give up the use of their vile puppet cliques to govern the people in the Indochinese countries, all the proposals for a cease-fire, an international conference, and so forth are nothing but cheating tricks."

TASS carries its usual prompt factual account of the proposal, followed by routine-level Moscow radio and press comment which generally follows the Vietnamese communist lead in complaining that the proposal is merely a way to continue aggression while hoodwinking public opinion. While there is no Soviet elite comment on the President's proposal, the 13 October Soviet-French communique on President Pompidou's visit says that the two sides agreed "to continue their efforts to promote talks between all the sides concerned" to insure the people of the area a chance "to be masters of their own destiny" on the basis of the Geneva agreements of 1954 and 1962.

Peking responds more quickly than it has to major U.S. pronouncements in the past, with comment on the 11th deprecating the President's speech point by point. Peking typically avoids any comment on the Paris talks or on the PRG's recent eight-point "elaboration" of the 10-point proposal.

The new Cambodian republic proclaimed by the Lon Nol regime on 9 October is denounced by a joint Sihanouk-FUNK-RGNU statement on the 10th. Peking supports the joint statement promptly on the same day with a PRC Government statement, but Moscow has acknowledged the proclamation of the republic only in brief TASS dispatches.

DRV, PRG ASSAIL PRESIDENT'S FIVE-POINT PEACE PROPOSAL

Initial Vietnamese communist reaction to the President's proposal came on the 8th in the remarks by the delegates at the Paris talks and in LPA and VNA commentaries, the latter published in

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the Hanoi press on the 9th, according to VNA's press review. The Front broadcast additional comment daily through the 13th. Hanoi followed the VNA commentary with a NHAN DAN Commentator article on 10 October but originated no further comment until the 14th, when the DRV Foreign Ministry statement* was released--initially at 1408 GMT in VNA's Vietnamese-language service channel from Hanoi to Paris, then carried in VNA's regular English-language transmission at 1709 GMT.

The foreign ministry statement echoes other comment in saying that public opinion had strongly demanded that the Nixon Administration give a serious response to the PRG's 17 September statement elaborating on the 10-point position. It adds that the President advanced what he called "a new initiative for peace" in an attempt "to extricate himself from his predicament and passivity and ease the pressure from public opinion." VNA's transmission of the DRV Foreign Ministry statement's "rejection" of the President's proposal was followed minutes later--at 1715 GMT--by an LPA report of PRG President Phat's interview in which he "severely condemns and resolutely rejects Nixon's fraudulent 'peace proposals.'"

The VNA commentary on the 8th, like other comment, observes that prior to the presidential address the U.S. propaganda machine and President Nixon himself made "much noise" about the forthcoming speech, saying it would be the most "complete" statement on the subject of attaining a Vietnam settlement. Both the VNA commentary and the NHAN DAN Commentator article call the proposal a "propaganda" move aimed at garnering more votes for the Republican Party in the November Congressional elections.

In her address at the Paris talks, which Liberation Radio broadcast in full on the 9th, Mme. Binh said that President Nixon's speech did not provide "any correct basis" on which to settle the war, that it showed that the United States does not really want to correctly settle the South Vietnam problem,

* The President's eight-point proposal of 14 May 1969 did not prompt a high-level official DRV statement. But his 3 November 1969 speech elicited government statements from both the DRV and PRG, and foreign ministry statements were issued by both following his 20 April and 30 June 1970 speeches on Cambodia.

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and that it was aimed at deceiving public opinion regarding the so-called U.S. "good will for peace." She added that her remarks were preliminary and that she would continue to comment "more concretely." Xuan Thuy, as reported by VNA, complained that the President's address was "not a serious response" to Mme. Binh's 17 September peace initiative.

BASIS FOR A SETTLEMENT The VNA commentary, like a 12 October Liberation Radio broadcast of an article by PRG delegation member Ly Van Sau,* duly notes the President's specific points in the order in which he outlined them--a cease-fire in place, an Indochina peace conference, a negotiated timetable for complete troop withdrawal, a search for a political settlement in South Vietnam, and the immediate and unconditional release of prisoners held by both sides. But this and other commentaries from the Front as well as from Hanoi complain that the President is subordinating the principles basic to a settlement. In the words of the foreign ministry statement, the President in his "so-called new initiative for peace was vague on two fundamental problems," namely U.S. troop withdrawal and the political problem in South Vietnam. And the statement says flatly that proposals on such subjects as a cease-fire and an international conference are nothing but "tricks" so long as the United States refuses to withdraw and supports the "puppets." The statement goes beyond other propaganda, however, in expanding these demands beyond Vietnam. It says that there must be a total withdrawal from "the Indochinese nations" and that the United States must "give up the use of their vile puppet cliques."

CEASE-FIRE The foreign ministry statement says that "playing upon the legitimate aspirations for peace" of the Vietnamese, American, and world people, President Nixon put forth a proposal for a cease-fire while continuing a policy "of aggression against Vietnam and refusing to withdraw troops and to renounce the maintenance of the Thieu-Ky-Khiem stooges." The statement echoes other propaganda in saying that the Vietnamese people "are ready to carry out the cease-fire modalities after the parties concerned have agreed upon and signed the agreements designed to stop the war and restore peace in Vietnam as expounded in the 17 September PRG statement."

* This is the first known instance of a commentary being attributed to a member of the Paris delegation.

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At the 8 October Paris session PRG chief delegate Mme. Binh prepared the groundwork for the propaganda response which views a cease-fire as the capstone to a settlement. She asked, for example, "How can there be a cease-fire when agreements on the fundamental questions do not yet exist?" The NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 10th somewhat amplifies Mme. Binh's 17 September statement in saying that cease-fire measures will be implemented after the parties have agreed upon total U.S. and allied troop withdrawal and the renunciation of Thieu-Ky-Khiem and establishment of a provisional coalition government. "Only in such conditions," Commentator says, "can a cease-fire meet the necessity to end the war of aggression." A Liberation Radio commentary of the 9th, vitriolic in its criticism (it refers to President Nixon as a "murderer and war criminal"), says that the President's cease-fire proposal was made in an attempt to stem the tide of allied defeat and 'wait for another opportunity to achieve their aggressive designs." The VNA commentary of the 8th notes that the cease-fire proposal comes at a time when the United States is currently pursuing its "piecemeal" troop reduction and Vietnamization policies and says that the proposal cannot "in reality reduce in the least the degree of brutality of the war that Nixon is carrying out on the Indochina Peninsula."

PROPAGANDA BACKGROUND: The issue of a cease-fire has been broached only rarely in recent propaganda. The 10 October NHAN DAN Commentator article now calls the President's cease-fire proposal a conditional one--"a type of cease-fire which was dealt with by the traitor Nguyen Van Thieu on 31 July 1970." But there is no known precedent for this acknowledgment of the substance of Thieu's speech. Propaganda at the time merely pointed up the coincidence in timing between the Thieu speech and President Nixon's 1 July TV interview following U.S. withdrawal from Cambodia. The only known acknowledgment that President Nixon mentioned a cease-fire in that interview appeared in a 4 July Liberation Radio commentary which, in discussing the interview, said merely that "Nixon repeated the 'cease-fire' and 'free elections' tricks that public opinion had rejected."

There is no known reference in Vietnamese communist media to the 1 September call for a standstill cease-fire sponsored by a group of U.S. Senators. The subject was raised in a question put to Xuan Thuy at a 2 September DRV National Day reception in Paris; his response was not carried in regular

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propaganda, although it was transmitted from Paris to Hanoi via VNA's service channel. He reportedly said that "according to the 10-point overall solution of the NFLSV and the PRG, a cease-fire will follow an agreement by all parties on fundamental issues." A similar statement made by DRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh in a 26 February 1970 interview with an AP correspondent was carried by VNA on 2 March: Trinh said that based on the 10 points, "the parties shall reach understanding to the effect of concluding agreements on the relevant questions with a view to bringing the war in South Vietnam to an end and contributing to the restoration of peace in Vietnam."

INDOCHINA The President's call for an Indochina peace
CONFERENCE conference was ignored by Mme. Binh and Xuan
 Thuy at the Paris session on the 8th, but
other propaganda has deprecated it in much the same fashion as the foreign ministry statement does: President Nixon's proposal to convene an international conference is nothing but a "cunning trick to deceive public opinion" since the United States "still refuses to respond to the NFLSV/PRG 10-point solution, the Pathet Lao five-point position, and Sihanouk's five-point declaration, and deadlocks the Paris conference and prevents the meeting between the plenipotentiaries of Princes Souphanouvong and Souvanna Phouma." The statement goes on to say that changing the form of the conference "to make it enlarged or restricted, open or private," is not the point.

BACKGROUND: Such propaganda as has broached the subject in recent months has consistently reflected a negative Vietnamese communist attitude toward a broadened international conference. Le Duc Tho, when asked on 10 April about the 1 April French cabinet suggestion of a broadened conference, replied negatively; VNA in its report on the 12th glossed over his remarks on the French proposal, but TASS reported his observation that a Vietnam settlement is the basis of a settlement for all of Indochina. Propaganda surrounding the Djakarta conference on Cambodia in mid-May reacted negatively to calls both for reconvening the Geneva conference and for reactivating the ICC. Subsequent calls for a broad conference by UN Secretary General U Thant were also assailed. PRG spokesman at the Paris talks Duong Dinh Thao was asked at a press briefing on 10 September about agreement to a new Geneva conference on Vietnam; Hanoi propaganda media as usual did not report the briefing, but

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VNA's service channel from Paris to Hanoi quoted Thao as saying "we have repeatedly said that the four-party conference in Paris is to settle the South Vietnam problem."

TROOP The President's expression of readiness to
WITHDRAWAL negotiate a timetable for complete withdrawal
 as part of an overall settlement and willingness
to withdraw all U.S. forces based on principles spelled out
previously prompted the communist delegates at Paris and other
propaganda to reiterate the standard call for a total,
unconditional withdrawal. The foreign ministry statement
complains that in saying withdrawal would be based on
principles which had been previously outlined, the President
was again calling for mutual troop withdrawal. It observes
that this time he related the problem of withdrawal to
total settlement of the Indochina problem--"thus posing
another condition for withdrawal." His "crafty" argument
that he is ready to hold discussions on a timetable, the
statement adds, was aimed at countering the fact that the
United States should clearly fix a definite timetable.
Much of the propaganda refers to the call in the PRG's
17 September proposal for a U.S. agreement to withdraw by
30 June 1971. And the 11 October Liberation Radio
commentary again calls it "most reasonable."

BACKGROUND: The Vietnamese communists have consistently
rejected the idea of any reciprocity in troop withdrawals and
have argued that the United States is the foreign aggressor,
Vietnam belongs to the Vietnamese, and the question of
Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam should be settled
among the Vietnamese. Denunciations of calls for a mutual
troop withdrawal in President Nixon's 14 May 1969 eight-point
proposal generally obscured the references to mutual troop
withdrawal over a 12-month period, as well as other details
of the proposal. Hanoi promptly denounced President Nixon's
statement in his 3 November 1969 address that a timetable for
the complete withdrawal of all U.S. combat ground forces had
been worked out but would not be made public.

POLITICAL The foreign ministry statement says that the U.S.
SETTLEMENT view on the right to self-determination boils
 down essentially to maintaining the Thieu-Ky-
Khiem "puppet clique," opposing the formation of a provisional
coalition government, and asking that the Saigon administration
organize fraudulent elections "at bayonet point of U.S.
occupation troops." It states that the President has "grossly

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distorted as an attempt at takeover by one party" the PRG's undertaking to form a provisional coalition government comprising three components.

The VNA commentary on the 8th says it is clear "that Nixon is not the least interested" in Mme. Binh's eight-point proposals in which she called for the establishment of a peaceful government in Saigon without Thieu, Ky, and Khiem. The NHAN DAN Commentator article, as broadcast by Hanoi radio, says "Nixon distorted the rational and sensible PRG proposal, which shows a spirit of national conciliation and broad solidarity, saying that the PRG wants to monopolize all power and adding that the United States cannot accept this very absurd demand."

POW ISSUE NHAN DAN's Commentator says that in his proposal urging the release of all prisoners-of-war President Nixon did not answer the "constructive proposal" made by Mme. Binh in her 17 September statement--that is, given U.S. intent to withdraw its forces by 30 June 1971, the parties would then immediately discuss the question of releasing captured military personnel. NHAN DAN also says that President Nixon used "empty" words in speaking of "'humanity'" on the POW problem so as to deceive public opinion and cover up U.S. "crimes" in South Vietnam.

Virtually all comment, including Liberation Radio commentaries on the 9th and 11th and the earlier LPA commentary of the 8th, portray the President's proposal as a "trick" and cite Mme. Binh's 17 September formulation as the way to solve the prisoner problem. "If Nixon really is concerned about the lives of American soldiers," the LPA commentary asks, "why does he not declare the total withdrawal of troops by 30 June 1971?"

Unlike the routine propaganda, the foreign ministry statement and President Phat in his interview acknowledged that the President had mentioned the release of civilian as well as military prisoners.

PATHET LAO DENOUNCES PRESIDENT NIXON'S SPEECH

The Pathet Lao criticizes President Nixon's 7 October speech in an NLHS Central Committee spokesman's statement carried by the Pathet Lao news agency on 13 October. Asserting that

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there is "nothing new" in the speech, the statement attacks each of the five points. It says that the President "laid stress" on his proposal for a standstill cease-fire, at a time when the United States maintains 400,000 troops in Vietnam and "tens of thousands" of Saigon troops in Cambodia and is bringing "additional U.S. military personnel" as well as Thai and South Vietnamese units into Laos. The cease-fire proposal, it charges, is aimed at legalizing the occupation of "the whole of Indochina" and at preventing the overthrow of U.S. "henchmen."

The statement says that the cease-fire proposal was linked with the "vague statement" concerning troop withdrawal, but it does not elaborate other than to say that this shows that the United States refuses to withdraw American and allied troops "speedily, totally, and unconditionally" from South Vietnam and to withdraw "U.S. military advisers and personnel" and Thai and Saigon mercenaries from Laos. It briefly mentions the proposals on an international peace conference on Indochina, a political settlement, and the release of prisoners of war only in commenting that they are "new and crafty contentions" aimed at misleading public opinion and at "justifying" the arguments regarding a cease-fire and troop withdrawal.

SIHANOUK REGIME CALLS NIXON PROPOSAL "A FRAUD"

An 11 October government statement delivers the official response of Sihanouk's regime to the President's speech. Publicized by Peking on the 13th and published in the Hanoi press the next day, the statement denounces the President's proposals as a "fraud" and declares that the only way to solve the Indochina question is for the United States and its allies to withdraw, cease their "aggression," and abide by the Geneva agreements of 1954 and 1962. Commenting on the points in the President's speech which pertain to Cambodia, the statement charges that his call for a cease-fire in place is aimed at perpetuating the "occupation" of Indochina by U.S. and allied troops, and it scores the idea of an international conference as an attempt to legalize U.S. "aggression and occupation" and the Phnom Penh administration.

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A less doctrinaire stance on the question of an international conference was taken by Sihanouk in a 10 October statement at a press conference in Peking, reported by NCNA on the 11th. Sihanouk stated that "we would accept a conference under the condition that Mr. Lon Nol and his puppet regime . . . do not attend the conference," but he went on to maintain that this would never happen. Sihanouk added that "we shall not accept this conference because we are united with a certain number of countries, and China is one of them." He maintained that a conference could not succeed without China and that China would not attend a conference with the Lon Nol government. He also voiced an objection to a conference on the ground that it would lead to the partition of Cambodia.

Later in his statement Sihanouk declared that while he would not negotiate with the Phnom Penh authorities, he is willing to negotiate with the United States "as the NFLSV is doing in Paris." He added that negotiations could take place "in any neutral country" and would be to "negotiate peace with the total, unconditional, and immediate withdrawal" of U.S. and allied troops--"that is to say, the non-Indochina troops"--from Cambodia.

Unlike the 11 October government statement, Sihanouk at his press conference took note of the specific Administration proposal for international supervision of a cease-fire. He commented that "we are against international control, for we have always been against the International Control Commission [ICC] because this commission has never been able to render service to peace in Indochina." Sihanouk has previously rejected a role for the ICC--for example, in a 21 May rally speech in Peking in which he denounced the 16-17 May Djakarta conference call for reactivation of the ICC and reconvening of the Geneva conference.

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SOVIET COMMENT DENIGRATES PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL

Moscow as usual promptly acknowledges President Nixon's 7 October peace plan with a TASS report the next day briefly outlining the five points. It sets the tone of subsequent comment when it says that in setting out the principles of a "political settlement," Nixon confirmed the U.S. policy of retaining in power the Thieu-Ky "clique" which "is one of the main obstacles on the road to a peaceful settlement." TASS also complains that the statement is silent about the PRG's "constructive proposals" of 17 September.

Commentators stress that the speech contains "nothing new" and that it is just a "propaganda" move made with an eye to the November elections. A domestic service commentary on the 8th, for example, says that the speech is mere "rhetoric" which fails to respond to the PRG initiative and which is designed merely to make Washington appear before the world as the "peacemaker."

CEASE-FIRE While the TASS report on the President's speech acknowledges his reference to the international supervision of a cease-fire, available Moscow comment on the address does not raise the aspect of international supervision. The first substantial press comment comes in a 10 October PRAVDA article by Vishnevskiy which says that the President's five points are aimed at "legalizing and perpetuating the U.S. intervention in Indochina." He notes that "Washington" says that the "pith" of the five points is the standstill cease-fire, and he asserts that its purpose is to freeze the positions of the U.S. interventionists in foreign territory to which the Indochinese patriots cannot agree.

A panelist in the 11 October domestic service roundtable discussion similarly complains that the purpose of the standstill cease-fire is to "legalize" U.S. occupation of part of South Vietnam, the occupation by South Vietnamese troops of part of Cambodian territory, and a "status quo" in Laos where there are now "more than 12,000 American advisers." Another panelist says that Nixon's expression of support for the Thieu-Ky regime means that Washington made its proposal with the "clear knowledge that it is unacceptable to the other side."

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INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE An IZVESTIYA article by Krynov, summarized by TASS on 12 October, similarly criticizes the cease-fire proposal and U.S. support for the Thieu-Ky regime. Krynov also says there is "nothing new" in the proposal for an international conference on Indochina, Washington having raised this question "many times" in the past. If the United States really wants a Vietnam solution, he says, there is no need for a new conference, the Paris conference offering opportunities for this. He adds that a settlement in Laos and Cambodia "is the business of the peoples in these countries." A roundtable panelist and an 11 October RED STAR article by Kushnir comment similarly on the international conference proposal.

In line with its consistent refusal to discuss a Soviet role in a settlement, Moscow ignores current comment by U.S. spokesmen on the subject. On 10 October TASS briefly reports that in his press conference the day before, Secretary Rogers was "forced to admit" that "judging from discussions with the other side or with any of their supporters, the United States has no reason to think that they will accept this initiative." But TASS does not report Rogers' expression of hope that after the initial public rejection the Vietnamese communists may enter into private talks on the proposals. A brief 12 October TASS report of the TV interview the day before of Secretaries Rogers and Laird does not acknowledge Rogers' expression of hope that PRAVDA's rejection does not reflect Moscow's private opinion and that world support for the proposals might influence Soviet opinion. Moscow has also ignored the 8 October press conference by State Department spokesman McCloskey in which he said he hoped that Moscow would use its influence to persuade the Vietnamese to accept the proposals and in which he revealed that Secretary Rogers spoke to Ambassador Dobrynin before the President delivered his speech.

TROOP WITHDRAWAL Several radio commentators focus on the complaint that the President failed to answer the "most important key question," the "complete and unconditional" withdrawal of U.S. and allied troops. They charge that instead he merely repeated "old proposals" about a cease-fire and political settlement while the U.S. Army remains in "occupation." They criticize the "vagueness" of the President's statement that the United States is prepared to withdraw forces as "part of a settlement based on the principles I spelled out previously and the proposals I am making tonight."

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A participant in the 11 October roundtable comments in this connection that the essence of President Nixon's past position has been mutual withdrawal of DRV troops said to be there, and another panelist interjects that the troops of the interventionists and those of the "patriotic forces of South Vietnam" cannot thus be placed on the same level. A domestic service commentator on the 9th similarly says that "simultaneous withdrawal" will not be accepted by the "South Vietnamese patriots."

The 10 October TASS report of Secretary Rogers' press conference the day before briefly charges that his statements concerning a troop withdrawal were "contradictory" and gave "no clear answer" to the question of whether the United States really intends to fulfill President Nixon's promise to withdraw about 95,000 troops by 1 May 1971. TASS does not elaborate on any of Rogers' comments that most of the troops would be out of a combat role. The 12 October TASS report of the Rogers-Laird TV interview says that their comments show that the United States plans to keep troops in Vietnam "indefinitely." TASS cites Laird as saying that the remaining troops will take direct part in military operations, and Rogers as saying that only after next May will a combat role be ended. On 13 October Moscow's domestic service reports President Nixon's announcement in Hartford that he would withdraw 40,000 troops by Christmas, ridiculing it as an election maneuver and noting that about 350,000 troops will remain to continue or even escalate the aggression.

PCW'S Krynov in IZVESTIYA on the 12th says that the question of the release of the prisoners of war was raised by the President to place on a par the aggressor and the people fighting for freedom and independence, to distract world opinion from the U.S. "mass crimes" in Vietnam, and to acquire "political capital" in the United States at election time. A roundtable panelist complains that the President is demanding the release of prisoners of war before agreeing to withdraw troops.

U.S. CRITICS Some Moscow comment stresses criticism of the
OF PRESIDENT President's plan at home. The 10 October PRAVDA article notes that the loudest Congressional applause for the speech came from "hawks" like Rivers, Stennis, and Jackson, and notes that former Defense Secretary Clifford said that he saw nothing new in the proposals. A 10 October IZVESTIYA article

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similarly mentions Clifford and also cites Senator Muskie as saying that the President's proposals "still leave a series of important problems unsolved." TASS on 8 October mentions Senator Fulbright as saying that there is hardly a chance for "big changes" since Nixon speaks of keeping Thieu and Ky in power.

PEKING SAYS PRESIDENT PRACTICES "PEACE TALKS FRAUD"

The initial Chinese response to the President's speech comes on 11 October in an NCNA commentary which deprecates each of the points in his five-point proposal. A 13 October PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article focuses its main attack on the President's call for a standstill cease-fire. Beginning on the 11th, Peking media have also carried reports on foreign reaction to the President's speech, fully reporting official comment by Sihanouk and his government and carrying excerpts from Vietnamese communist comment. The Chinese reaction is unusually prompt and detailed: Peking never directly commented on President Nixon's 14 May 1969 eight-point proposal on Vietnam; the first detailed Chinese comment on the President's 3 November 1969 speech on Vietnam came 10 days later.*

The 11 October NCNA commentary accuses President Nixon of "again practicing a 'peace talks' fraud on the Indochina question," and both it and the PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article reject the President's cease-fire proposal as an effort to make the Indochinese people recognize U.S. "aggression" as legal and to deny them the right to resist. NCNA accurately quotes from the first point of the President's proposal noting that the projected cease-fire would require the forces to remain in place, would encompass all types of war actions, and would cover all of Indochina. Comment does not note the President's call for international supervision. NCNA acknowledges this point, however, in reporting Sihanouk's rejection of international supervision in his 10 October press conference statement.

* See FBIS SURVEY of 22 May 1969, pages 1-4, and 13 November 1969, pages 8-10.

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Responding to President Nixon's call for a conference on Indochina, PEOPLE'S DAILY charges that the proposal is "merely a plot which U.S. imperialism has long been hatching to strangle the revolutionary struggle of the Indochinese people through international interference." The article and the NCNA commentary denounce the President's reference to the Geneva agreements, which they say "have long been torn into pieces by U.S. imperialism." Commentator adds that the United States has cast the agreements "into oblivion."

Peking ignores the President's references to the reduction of U.S. forces in Vietnam in the past 20 months, but the NCNA commentary notes--and derides--his offer to negotiate an agreed timetable for complete withdrawal. Both NCNA and PEOPLE'S DAILY advocate the "immediate" complete withdrawal of U.S. forces. And NCNA charges that while the President used no "words like 'mutual troops withdrawals' as he had mentioned before," he "in fact is playing the same trick" The NCNA commentary briefly dismisses the President's fourth and fifth points, on a political settlement in South Vietnam and prisoners of war, without describing their content.

Comment on the President's speech, following the standard practice of Chinese propaganda, makes no mention of the Paris talks or the communist negotiating positions, and these topics are also omitted from Peking's accounts of Vietnamese comment. But in keeping with the usual practice of fully reporting statements by Sihanouk and his government, the NCNA report of Sihanouk's 10 October press conference includes references to the Paris talks and to the PRG/NFLSV eight points and NCNA's account of the text of the 11 October statement by Sihanouk's government includes references to the DRV's four-point stand and the PRG/NFLSV 10-point solution and eight-point elaboration, as well as to the March 1970 five-point statement and 20 July memorandum of the Laotian Patriotic Front Central Committee. The only previous Peking reference to the 17 September PRG/NFLSV eight-point elaboration was in Peking reports of a Sihanouk government statement supporting the proposal and noting that it had been presented at the Paris conference.*

* See 23 September TRENDS, page 1.

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MOSCOW HITS PEKING SILENCE ON PRG INITIATIVE

In a commentary broadcast in Mandarin on 8 October, Radio Peace and Progress has again criticized Peking for ignoring the PRG's eight-point proposal.* The commentary recalls that in his 2 October Hanoi speech Brezhnev expressed support for the PRG initiative and that the other socialist countries have also supported it. Peking's "strict silence," the commentary says, shows that the PRC does not truly support the Vietnamese people. It also charges the "present leaders of China" with trying to manipulate the Vietnamese situation to serve their own "great power chauvinist policy" and to impose their view that "armed struggle" is the only way to true independence.

The commentary recalls that in the past the Peking leaders adopted more forceful measures than merely remaining silent, noting that articles in PEOPLE'S DAILY in the spring of 1968--at a time when the DRV and PRG leaders proposed peace negotiations--bluntly stated that "any and all peace settlements were a great fraud."

* See the 30 September TRENDS, page 5, for background on a similar 28 September broadcast.

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SIHANOUK, PRC GOVERNMENT SCORE NEW CAMBODIAN REPUBLIC

On 10 October, NCHA carries a joint Sihanouk-FUNK-RGNU statement which denounces the Lon Nol regime's 9 October proclamation of Cambodia as a republic. FUNK radio carries the text on 13 October but VNA carries only a summary on the 12th. Promptly on the 10th a PRC Government statement expresses "firm support for the just stand of the Kingdom of Cambodia." NCHA on the 12th publicizes Sihanouk's "10th message to the Khmer nation" which "severely condemns and exposes the 'republic' fraud" of the Lon Nol regime.

SIHANOUK The joint Sihanouk-FUNK-RGNU statement charges
STATEMENTS that the new Cambodian republic is "illegal,
 antipopular, antidemocratic and antinational."

It says among other things that the republic "governs only Phnom Penh," and that "all the rest of the country is practically in the hands of the FUNK, whose national liberation forces appear everywhere." The statement acknowledges that "it is true that some important provincial cities, although attacked, have not yet been occupied" by FUNK forces, but says that "the American press itself admitted that these cities are in contact with Phnom Penh only by air."

The statement expresses the hope that states and governments will refuse to recognize the republic and that those countries "which have left their embassies in Phnom Penh" after the 18 March coup "without recognizing the Lon Nol regime will reconsider their position." It also appeals to states and governments to recognize the RGNU if they have not yet done so.

The statement makes the assurance that "we are far from opposing a genuine republicanization" of Cambodia, but claims that if the members of the Lon Nol regime were real republicans and democrats they would have waited until the end of the war for a national referendum to determine the question, as the FUNK "has always advocated."

NCHA on the 11th reports that Sarin Chhak, RGNU foreign minister, held a press conference on the 10th to publicize the joint statement. According to NCHA, he claimed that the republic is "totally illegal" and repeated the notion that "we do not oppose the installation of a republic" if this is a desire expressed by "all the people in liberty." He also appealed to states and governments to refuse to recognize "the so-called 'republic.'"

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HCNA on 12 October publicizes Sihanouk's "10th message to the Khmer nation," dated the 12th, which again argues that the new Cambodian republic is "antipopular, antidemocratic, and anti-national," and calls on various people to "rise in revolt and join the people's revolution carried out by the FUNK" to "sweep away" the Lon Nol administration.

SUPPORT BY PRC GOVERNMENT Promptly following the release of the Sihanouk-FUNK-RGNU joint statement, HCNA on the 10th carries a PRC Government statement which says that the Chinese Government and people "firmly support this just stand of the Kingdom of Cambodia."* Declaring that the establishment of the Cambodian republic was "a puppet farce stage-managed single-handedly by U.S. imperialism," the statement reaffirms that the RGNU is "the sole lawful government" of the Cambodian people. It notes that the PRC Government and people "firmly support" the Cambodian people's struggle and oppose sabotaging activities of the United States and "its collaborator" through the UN or other means.

On 12 October HCNA carries a Sihanouk statement of the previous day thanking Chou En-lai for the PRC statement and calling China "the best friend and the greatest and most effective support of the Khmer people."

DRV COMMENT A NHAN DAN commentary carried by VNA on the 11th is the only available DRV comment. Scoring the establishment of the republic, it cites Sihanouk's 28 September statement**--carried by HCNA on the 29th--in which he denounced Cambodia's intention to create a republic. NHAN DAN claims that the Khmer people, "united in the FUNK" led by Sihanouk, "are winning ever bigger victories in all fields," and it says that the establishment of the republic cannot help the Lon Nol regime "out of its critical situation."

* Previous PRC Government statements on the Cambodian situation were issued on 4 May and 28 April. The May statement supported the Sihanouk, DRV, PRC, and NLHS statements following the U.S. entry into Cambodia. The 28 April statement supported the joint declaration of the Indochinese peoples summit conference.

** See FBIS TRENDS 30 September, page 7.

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The VNA summary of the Joint Sihanouk-FUNK-RGNU statement notes among other things that it voiced the hope that states and governments will refuse to recognize the "bogus republic."

MOSCOW The only available Moscow acknowledgment of the new republic comes in very brief TASS dispatches from New York and Washington on 9 October which report the proclamation of the new republic and note that Cheng Heng, "appointed by the present Phnom Penh authorities to be head of the proclaimed republic," has arrived in Washington to meet President Nixon.

DRV ISSUES WAR CRIMES COMMUNIQUE, CLAIMS U.S. PLANE DOWNED

VNA on 8 October reports a DRV War Crimes Commission communique on alleged war crimes in both parts of Vietnam during September. In South Vietnam, the communique charges, allied troops launched "daily raids of battalion size or more" against the population and it cites various incidents as "typical." Charges against U.S.-GVN bombings, including B-52's, are also enumerated. The familiar complaint that the Saigon administration "took brutal repressive measures against students, war invalids, and the press" is again made. In regard to the press, it claims that the Saigon administration "seized those newspapers which denounced their criminal acts or spoke of peace, democracy, coalition government, etc."

Reviewing alleged crimes in North Vietnam, the communique gives the usual roundup of reconnaissance flights and charges the United States with the use of both tactical and strategic bombers against Quang Binh Province and Vinh Linh area. It further routinely claims that U.S. artillery from the Seventh Fleet and south of the Ben Hai demarcation river shelled villages in the northern part of the DMZ. It echoes previous communiques in scoring the use of U.S. ships for off-shore patrols, but it is unique in charging that on 18 September two U.S. destroyers "penetrated up to 13 kilometers of Cua Chau river (Ha Tinh Province) in brazen violation of the DRV territorial waters."

On 30 September, VNA says that an unmanned U.S. reconnaissance plane was downed over Hoa Binh Province on 26 September, bringing the number of U.S. planes allegedly downed over the North to 3,362.

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LAOTIAN INDEPENDENCE ANNIVERSARY OBSERVED

Communist media give considerable publicity to the 25th anniversary of the proclamation of Laos' independence (12 October) and the attendant solidarity month called for by the WPC and the 19-21 May Cairo conference on solidarity with Laos. Pathet Lao propaganda includes a "grand rally at the NLHS central command," chaired by Prince Souphanouvong. An "appeal" by Prince Souphanouvong and a Pathet Lao radio "editorial" review the 25-year history of the Laotian people's struggle against imperialism. There is, however, no mention of the "genuine revolutionary party," which had been discussed in an unusual anniversary article carried by the Pathet Lao news agency on 5 October.*

HANOI Events in Hanoi include a "grand meeting" in the capital, AND PRG with Hoang Van Hoan the ranking official present, and a reception hosted by the Laotian delegation, led by Gen. Phoune Sipraseuth, and attended by Truong Chinh, Vo Nguyen Giap, Nguyen Duy Trinh, and Hoang Van Hoan, among others. Greeting messages to Prince Souphanouvong from DRV and PRG leaders express "support" for the Laotian people's struggle as well as for the NLHS five-point program for a settlement. An LPA editorial promises "all the help" the South Vietnamese people can muster and recalls that the visit to the Laotian liberated zone by a PRG/NFLSV delegation led by Tran Buu Kiem in 1969 was a landmark in developing friendly relations between South Vietnam and Laos.

The DRV speaker at the Hanoi meeting points to the history of close relations between Vietnam and Laos and says the two peoples now "unite" to fight the aggressors. "The realities of the past many years," he adds, "have proved that the destinies of the three Indochinese countries are closely connected with each other."

Speaking at the same meeting, Phoune Sipraseuth says that the Laotian people's victories "cannot be separated from the militant solidarity and mutual support of the Indochinese peoples" and "the effective assistance of the governments and peoples of the socialist countries"--a remark he repeats at the reception. At the Hanoi meeting he thanks the Vietnamese people for having "spared no effort to step up assistance to the Laotian revolution in all

* See the FBIS TRENDS of 7 October, pages 11-12.

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aspects." Speaking at the reception, he refers to the contacts which have been going on between the Princes, after having criticized the Vientiane side for "refusing to make an appropriate response" to the NLHS five-point political solution. In the course of denigrating President Nixon's 7 October speech as an election maneuver, he points to the Pathet Lao's peace efforts, noting that the NLHS sent Tiao Souk Vongsak to Vientiane as a special representative to discuss with Souvanna Phouma preparations for a Khang Khay meeting of representatives of the two Princes.* Charging that a settlement is being "prevented and sabotaged" by the United States and its "stooges," he calls Nixon's peace initiative a "trick" to cover up this "scheme."

PEKING Peking's attention to the anniversary includes a greetings message from Chou En-lai and an 11 October reception hosted by friendship associations which was attended by Li Hsien-nien and Kuo Mo-jo. Consistent with its usual practice, Peking does not mention the current contacts between the Laotian Princes and makes only pro forma references to a Laotian settlement, placing its usual stress on a "protracted struggle" in Laos. In reporting on the various speeches in Hanoi, NCNA does note that at the reception Phoune Sipraseuth called the NLHS five-point solution "the most correct basis" for settling the Laotian question, but it does not mention his charge that the United States is "preventing" contacts between the Princes.

Chou's message praises the close unity of the three Indochinese people who have formed a "powerful united front" against U.S. "aggression." Although he demands that the United States stop the bombing and withdraw its troops so that the Laotian people may settle their affairs themselves, he does not mention the five points. He expresses confidence that the Laotian people, "persevering in a protracted war," will win complete victory. Speaking at the reception, Kuo Mo-jo praises the Indochinese people's "unity" in their "protracted war," expressing the PRC's "firm support," and a 12 October PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial comments similarly. Neither Kuo nor the editorial mentions a Laotian settlement, although PEOPLE'S DAILY does denounce President Nixon's initiative on Indochina.

* Phoune Sipraseuth has been appointed as Souphanouvong's plenipotentiary in these contacts.

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MOSCOW Moscow marks the anniversary with brief reports of a Moscow public meeting at which Soviet speakers condemned U.S. "aggression" and the head of a Laotian delegation thanked the Soviets for their "great and effective help." Moscow radio reports that in an anniversary interview with its correspondent, Prince Souphanouvong "expressed great appreciation for the support and assistance of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries."

Routine comment points to NLHS efforts to reach a political settlement, recalling the five-point program put forward by the NLHS last March and the talks it has been conducting in Vientiane through a special representative. A domestic service commentary on the 12th says that a political settlement "could have been achieved long ago had it not been for American interference." An 11 October IZVESTIYA article on the anniversary routinely notes that it is not accidental that U.S. "aggression" in Laos has intensified at the very time when, "thanks to the consistent work of the NLHS, an opportunity has arisen for contacts between the main political forces."

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MIDDLE EAST

The Soviet Foreign Ministry statement of 8 October responding to a U.S. "campaign of slander" to misrepresent the USSR's Middle East policy sets the tone for current propaganda. In essence defensive, the statement stresses Soviet support for Jarring's mission and the cease-fire and reaffirms Moscow's insistence on a political settlement based on Security Council Resolution 242 of November 1967 and its intention to promote this through bilateral and four-power consultations. The statement, and other propaganda, counter that it is Israel and the United States, not the Soviet Union and the UAR, who are responsible for "aggravating" the situation. At the same time, propaganda points to the UAR's "expressed readiness" to prolong the cease-fire "for another three months" as evidence of Egyptian sincerity in contributing to a speedy settlement.

While Moscow had been reluctant to acknowledge that it had been approached by the United States with respect to UAR cease-fire violations, the foreign ministry statement twice refers vaguely to official Soviet-U.S. contacts--in connection with the Jarring talks and U.S. reconnaissance overflights of the UAR. The statement acknowledges for the first time that the USSR stands accused of responsibility for the cease-fire violations, and that this pertains to Soviet complicity with regard to missile movement.

Comment at the same time repeatedly deplores the United States' "obstructionist" step in discontinuing participating in the Big Four deputies' consultations at the United Nations, describing this action as an attempt to complicate matters and frustrate Jarring's mission.

Reportage on UAR developments again stresses the Egyptians' desire for continuity in following Nasir's policies and underline the people's support for as-Sadat's candidacy for president, and again emphasizes Cairo's appreciation of Soviet-UAR cooperation and Moscow's assistance to the UAR. Moscow gives little attention to Cairo's diplomatic contacts with a view to raising the Middle East question in the UN General Assembly.

FOREIGN MINISTRY STATEMENT RESPONDS TO "SLANDERS" AGAINST USSR

The Soviet Foreign Ministry statement accuses "officials in the United States" of "various falsehoods" to the effect that the Middle East situation is worsening due to the USSR's position

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and that Moscow "allegedly 'goes back on its commitments' in connection with the cease-fire" in the Suez Canal zone. It attributes a U.S. press "campaign of slander" against the Soviet Union to "obvious incitation from official circles," claiming that the campaign aims at deliberately misrepresenting Soviet policy and exonerating the "Israeli ruling circles" which are "directly responsible" for the worsening of the situation, violation of the cease-fire agreement, and for "difficulties" encountered by the Jarring mission. The statement complains that attempts are made to mislead world public opinion and shift the responsibility for the situation to the Soviet Union and the Arab countries.*

In one of the two references to U.S.-Soviet contacts, the statement says that the USSR Government declared to the U.S. Government that the Soviet side "is ready to make its contribution" so the Jarring talks could be started at the earliest date. While the statement notes that the Soviet Union "from the very outset had consistently advocated a cease-fire," it adds that as is well known by the U.S. Government, the Soviet Union "did not take part in drafting any terms of the cease-fire" in the Suez Canal zone. It complains of a "campaign of slander instigated" in the United States to "cast aspersions at the Soviet Union's position, to impute to it violation of a certain agreement." And it specifies that "false rumors" were circulated that SAMs "manned by Soviet crews had appeared in the Suez Canal zone," calling this a "deliberate fraud."

As for charges of UAR violations of the cease-fire agreement, the statement again refers to UAR refutations and in turn again accuses Israel of violations with "almost daily" intrusions into UAR air space and construction of fortifications, including "missile installations," within the 50-kilometer zone on the east side of the canal.

* This is the third consecutive year that a Soviet Foreign Ministry statement has been issued in September or October. But while the two previous statements at this level--on 25 September 1968 and 31 October 1969--were presented at press conferences held by the then Soviet Foreign Ministry press spokesman, Zamyatin, the current one is released routinely by TASS.

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TASS commentator Velichanskiy on the 9th elaborated on the argument that the Soviet Union did not participate in drafting the cease-fire terms and could not be accused of violating them. There is no basis for such an accusation, he said, since the USSR did not take part in preparing any conditions of the cease-fire "and is not a party to any agreements." He claimed that "official U.S. representatives themselves stressed this detail when speaking off the record, not within the framework of briefing, for American journalists." The Soviet Union, Velichanskiy maintained, is not able to break obligations which it has not taken on itself. Like other commentators, Velichanskiy called "so-called 'violations'" ascribed to the Soviet Union, such as Soviet-manned missile installations in the Suez Canal zone, as "purest invention."

Subsequent propaganda makes no issue of the remark in the foreign ministry statement about the United States "trying to assume the 'right'" of reconnaissance flights over the UAR. Moscow has only infrequently, and cautiously, referred to the matter of aerial surveillance. Aside from the foreign ministry statement's charge of "almost daily" Israeli intrusions into UAR air space, there have been occasional past references to Israeli reconnaissance, as in Nikolayev's 22 September IZVESTIYA article. Charges of Israeli violations of the cease-fire terms have, however, primarily concerned alleged fortification and construction activities in the Israeli zone on the eastern side of the canal.*

Background: The foreign ministry statement comes against a background of complaints in Moscow propaganda against the anti-Soviet tenor of U.S. press stories. The 22 September IZVESTIYA article by Nikolayev first took note of such articles, remarking that the "anti-Soviet escalation of the American press" was "damaging politically, clouding both the chances of a Middle East peace and the entire international situation." A Fedorov article in NEW TIMES No. 39 (Russian edition 25 September) pointed, like Nikolayev, to "malicious anti-Soviet articles" by such commentators as Joseph Alsop and Roscoe Drummond. And Fedorov asserted that the New York TIMES attempted to place responsibility for the stalemated Jarring talks not on Israel but on the UAR "and the Soviet Union as well." Moreover, he added, the TIMES

* See the FBIS TRENDS of 2 September, page 20, 16 September, page 15, and 23 September, page 26.

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tried to cast doubt "in general on the expediency of any talks with the Soviet Union," particularly with regard to strategic arms limitation and European security.

Among other remonstrations about "anti-Sovietism" in the American press, Matveyev in IZVESTIYA on 2 October complained of "exaggerated" stories of "some 'expansionist motives'" in Soviet foreign policy, and observed regretfully that even the TIMES' Reston had advanced "hackneyed" arguments that "the USSR has supposedly provoked the worsening of the international situation and the U.S. Administration is an 'innocent victim.'"

MOSCOW EXPLOITS U.S. SUSPENSION OF BIG FOUR DEPUTIES' TALKS

Soviet propaganda, in a clear effort to counter charges of Soviet bad faith with respect to the cease-fire violations, seizes on the U.S. announcement on 6 October of its wish to suspend the Middle East talks of the Big Four deputies at the United Nations. By this "negative attitude," Moscow says, the United States tries to further complicate Jarring's mission and the Middle East situation as a whole, and jeopardizes the possibility of a peaceful settlement.

Propagandists contrast Washington's "obstructionist" approach with the "peaceful step" of the UAR in expressing readiness to prolong the cease-fire agreement "for another three months." A foreign-language commentary by Tsoppi on the 8th complained that the United States' "unilateral decision" paralyzes the consultations which "would considerably increase the chances of a political settlement," and noted that it was taken "only a few hours" after the UAR Government "agreed to a three-month extension," provided that the extension "was used seriously to try and find ways of implementing" Resolution 242.

Koryavin noted in the 11 October IZVESTIYA that Washington, attempting to justify this "obstructive" step, was repeating the "same preposterous accusations" of UAR violations of the cease-fire agreement to "strengthen its 'substantiation' of its decision." He added that Washington was also arguing that the United States "is not in a position to continue consultations" in New York since "the main points which form the basis of the so-called Rogers plan

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are not being observed." Finding this reasoning "strange to say the least," Koryavin said that Security Council Resolution 242, not the Rogers plan, is the basis for the four-power consultations. He charged that by its refusal to take part in the Big Four deputies' meetings, the United States was helping Tel Aviv to wreck a peaceful settlement.

Moscow joins with Paris, in the 13 October "declaration" on President Pompidou's visit to the USSR, in expressing the "opinion that the four permanent members of the UN Security Council should step up their consultations to work out appropriate recommendations for Dr. Jarring so as to promote the success of his mission." The French-Soviet declaration also says the sides "note with satisfaction efforts made for a cease-fire" in the Middle East, and express the hope that "in the nearest future discussion will be started in a constructive spirit" through Jarring, leading to agreement on a just and lasting peace based on Resolution 242. Such an agreement, the declaration says, would include provisions both for Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories and for recognition by each of the concerned countries of the sovereignty, political independence, and territorial integrity of all countries of the region.

Belyayev had said, in an INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS article (signed to press 22 September), that it was necessary for Jarring to receive "some concerted advice from the four great powers," which have been holding consultations for over a year and a half "on all the problems connected with a Middle East settlement." He warned that any "unilateral steps" would bring nothing but disappointment, and would only offer an opportunity to "carry on a backstage game" for those "who would like to frustrate a settlement."* Belyayev also

* Belyayev suggested that a negotiated Middle East settlement could serve as an example in other international questions: There is no doubt, he said, that such a settlement "would pave the way to the solution of other disputed international problems by means of negotiations, taking account of the interests not only of the sides directly participating in the Israeli-Arab conflict but also of all those who helped to achieve the desired settlement."

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rejected the "monstrous slander" that the Soviet Union "is supposedly striving for the annihilation of Israel," citing in rebuttal both Soviet support for Resolution 242 which recognizes each country's right to independent existence, and Brezhnev's statement in this respect in his 28 August speech in Alma-Ata.

REPORTAGE ON UAR AGAIN STRESSES CONTINUITY OF COURSE

Moscow's reportage on events in the UAR as the country prepares for the presidential referendum continues the line that the Egyptian people and leaders intend to adhere to Nasir's course. TASS on the 8th cited as-Sadat as issuing a pledge to this effect in his National Assembly speech accepting nomination to the presidency. A panelist on the 11 October domestic service commentators' roundtable observed that the unanimous nomination of as-Sadat frustrated "hopeful speculation of some Western leaders" that a long power vacuum would occur in Cairo.

The theme of continuing UAR-Soviet friendship is also underlined: TASS on the 12th reported that as-Sadat, receiving one of many Egyptian delegations which have called on him to pledge support, declared that "if the United States wants to cast aspersions on the Soviet Union's stand, I assure you that the USSR sincerely and honestly placed and is placing at our disposal everything essential to make our efforts stronger, and at the same time by no means interfering in our internal affairs." He explained, Cairo radio said on the 11th, that this is "because the USSR knows that we will not deviate from or part with" Nasir's teachings. On the 12th, Cairo reported as-Sadat as telling still another group that the Soviet Union, after Nasir's death, "continues to provide aid and the latest military devices and to train our sons on how to use them," and still another delegation was told by him that day that an "electronic war" has been imposed on the UAR, and "we are receiving full training from the Soviet Union to proceed in this direction."

Cairo's MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA) reported on the 14th that as-Sadat that day received UAR War Minister Fawzi, accompanied by the "chief Soviet expert in the UAR" for a

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half-hour audience.* The day before, both TASS and MENA reported the arrival in Cairo of new Soviet Ambassador Vladimir Vinogradov. In a biographical note on the ambassador broadcast in Arabic on the 13th, Moscow said he "was active in taking part in planning the measures" adopted by the CPSU and Soviet Government toward solving the Middle East conflict, and that he has an "excellent knowledge of the problems" of Middle East countries and has "actively assisted" in promoting UAR-Soviet friendship and cooperation.

MIDEAST ISSUE IN GENERAL ASSEMBLY PRAVDA's Glukhov, in an article on the 11th, reported from Cairo that the UAR, in "exposing imperialist intrigues" in the Middle East, is continuing its "active foreign policy" in the struggle for a political settlement of the crisis. Moscow has given little publicity, however, to Cairo's diplomatic contacts in connection with raising the Middle East question in the UN General Assembly. Only a broadcast in Arabic on the 10th cited the Cairo AL-AHRAM as saying that Egypt would ask the UN for the adoption of sanctions against Israel; this report, and another in Arabic the next day, briefly mentioned UAR diplomatic contacts in connection with "forthcoming steps" at UNGA on the Middle East. An Arabic-language broadcast on the 13th reported that Foreign Minister Riyad, leaving Cairo for New York, told reporters he intended to table the Middle East question for discussion in view of Israel's "torpedoing" all attempts for a peaceful solution of the problem, and that the General Assembly must take "special measures" for implementing Resolution 242. TASS the same day, reporting Riyad's stopover in Rome, quoted him as saying that the purpose of the trip was to describe the Middle East situation to the General Assembly, and as expressing the hope

* Iraqi Defense Minister Hammad Shihab was reported by TASS on the 13th as having been received by Kosygin for a talk "in a friendly atmosphere" on bilateral relations, with Defense Minister Grechko's participation. TASS, noting that Shihab "is currently having a rest" in the USSR, did not mention any discussion of the Middle East situation. Shihab, who had left on 15 September for the USSR "for medical tests and treatment," according to the IRAQI NEWS AGENCY (INA), was reported by TASS on 16 September as having had a "friendly talk" that day with Grechko, Deputy Defense Minister Zakharov, and the Iraqi ambassador; the latter arrived in Baghdad on 7 October "on a vacation," INA reported.

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that it would exert every effort to restore peace. On arrival in New York, according to TASS on the 14th, Riyadh told newsmen the UAR was prepared to resume the Jarring contacts "at any time" to search for ways of a peaceful settlement.

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NIXON TRIP

PEKING CALLS TOUR A SHOW OF FORCE TO ARABS, SOVIETS

In Peking's first substantive comment on President Nixon's European trip which ended on 5 October, an NCNA report on the 9th interpreted the tour as a show of force in connection with the Middle East situation and the Soviet-U.S. rivalry in that area. The report mentioned that Yugoslavia was one of the five countries visited, but Peking has not commented on that leg of the trip or reported the President's activities there. Earlier Chinese coverage of the trip was confined to reports on hostile demonstrations in Italy, Britain, and Ireland.

The 9 October report said the trip took place at a time when the United States was meeting obstacles in pressing the Rogers plan, when its "instigation of the Jordanian reactionaries" to attack the Palestinian guerrillas had suffered setbacks, and when its "collusion and contention with another 'superpower'" over spheres of influence in the Middle East had encountered "serious difficulties." NCNA claimed that the President went to the Mediterranean and visited the Sixth Fleet as a show of force to "cow the Palestinian and other Arab peoples" and at the same time to "intimidate the other 'superpower' to make it more obedient." The report did not discuss the visit in any context other than the Middle East.

Peking's recent comment on the Middle East has attacked Moscow for supporting U.S. efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement and for acting as a "co-plotter" with Washington in putting pressure on Syria not to intervene in the Jordanian fighting last month. Consistent with this line, NCNA's report on the President's trip claimed that the United States and the Soviet Union are "unanimous" in seeking to suppress revolutionary armed struggle in the Middle East, but it also pointed to "contradictions" between the two superpowers over spheres of influence in that area. According to NCNA, it was for the purpose of displaying U.S. military strength to "the other 'superpower'" that the President visited the Sixth Fleet and stressed the uses of American power in the Mediterranean.

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In the past year Peking's variations on the theme of Soviet-U.S. "collusion and contention," as in its comment on the President's trip, have tended to play up contentious rather than congruent interests. Previously, Peking had been obsessively concerned with signs of collusion between its two big rivals, particularly in its portrayal of a joint effort to contain or "encircle" China. The trend in the past year, coinciding with the resumption of Sino-U.S. contacts and the Sino-Soviet talks, has been in keeping with Peking's effort to emerge from isolation and to seek leverage for contesting the dominant role of the two superpowers.

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USSR AND CUBA

TASS DENIES CONSTRUCTION OF SOVIET MILITARY BASE IN CUBA

Foreshadowed by a 10 October article by IZVESTIYA's authoritative commentator Matveyev, an authorized TASS statement on the 13th formally denies that a Soviet submarine base is being built in Cuba or that the USSR is "doing anything that would contradict" the U.S.-Soviet "understanding" that ended the missile crisis in 1962. Like the Matveyev article in IZVESTIYA and a 30 September Rutiani article in PRAVDA, in which Moscow first reacted to the U.S. press reports of concern about Soviet activity in the area, the statement does not directly acknowledge the warning by a White House source on 25 September that the United States would regard any Soviet attempt to establish a strategic naval base in the Caribbean as a violation of the 1962 agreement.

The TASS denial is couched in carefully restrictive terms. It states, twice, that the Soviet Union has not built and is not building "its military base on Cuba"--a scrupulous rendering, at the expense of English syntax, of a Russian construction that conveys the meaning "a military base of its own." The phrase in Russian is "ne stroit svoyey voyennoy bazy na Kube." It incorporates a possessive and could not properly be rendered as "... a [or any] military base."

Two monitored Radio Moscow news reports of the TASS statement on the 13th, in English to Southeast Asia and in Spanish to Cuba, paraphrased it as saying the Soviet Union has not built and is not building "a base in Cuba" (English) and "any military base in Cuba" (Spanish). The loose paraphrases in these routine-level radio versions do not, however, divest the careful official formulation of possible significance. The denials in Soviet newspaper and press agency comment have also been carefully phrased. A TASS commentary in English on the 13th, by Nikolai Chigir, adheres to the language of the official statement in reiterating that the USSR "is not building its military base in Cuba" and repeatedly denies reports about a "Soviet base" in Cuba.

The official statement refers specifically to "concoctions" to the effect that the Soviet Union "allegedly began building on Cuba 'a permanent strategic naval base for its nuclear submarines.'" The Chigir TASS commentary cites a 9 October statement by Defense Secretary Laird on a "Soviet base" in Cuba which "would be able to serve submarines," declaring that "there is no such base in exis-

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tence, and no construction work of this kind has been carried on or is under way." Chigir also rejects allegations about Soviet construction of "a permanent strategic base for its atomic submarines." Matveyev in IZVESTIYA similarly denied as "completely groundless" the specific charge that the USSR "intends to create on Cuba a base for submarines equipped with missile armaments." The earlier article by Ratiani in PRAVDA had not mentioned submarine bases and stopped short of outright denial in ridiculing American press stories about "some sort of preparations" in Cuba.

In its official denial and in the signed, printed commentaries, the precise phrasing thus does not exclude the possibility that the Soviets might be building or assisting in the construction of a "Cuban base" or that the Soviets might intend to use a facility in Cuba for bunkering purposes. The statement and the Matveyev article both clearly uphold the right of Soviet vessels to call at Cuban ports. The statement declares that if Soviet ships enter foreign ports, "including ports of the Republic of Cuba," they do so with the consent of the host governments and exercise "an inalienable right of sovereign states, universally recognized and confirmed by many centuries of international practice." The Matveyev article, stating that calls of Soviet ships at Cuban ports "are the normal, accepted practice for all countries possessing a fleet," buttressed the argument by citing the statement of an unnamed U.S. official that the visits of Soviet naval detachments to Cuba "do not contravene any existing agreement."

Moscow, like Havana, gave notably scant publicity to the visit of a Soviet naval task force which arrived in Cuba on 9 September; the last monitored Moscow reference to the activities of the visiting seamen was on 13 September and the last Cuban reference was on the 14th. Neither Moscow nor Havana publicized the subsequent departure of any part of the squadron--possibly because publicity for the departure of some of the vessels would have called attention to the continued presence of the Soviet submarine tender which, according to a U.S. Defense Department announcement, finally left Cienfuegos on 10 October and headed eastward toward open sea.

1962 AGREEMENT The TASS statement couples the denial that the Soviet Union has built or is building "its military base on Cuba" with the avowal that it "is not doing anything that would contradict the understanding reached between the governments of the USSR and the United States in 1962." The

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statement rejects as a "concoction" any charge of possible Soviet violations of the understanding, insisting that the USSR "has always strictly adhered to this understanding, will adhere to it in the future, too, and proceeds from the assumption that the American side will also strictly fulfill this understanding." But the statement does not go on to define the "understanding."

The Matveyev article and the Chigir commentary are more specific in recalling that following a pledge by President Kennedy that there would be no invasion of Cuba by "the United States or other Western hemisphere countries," the Soviet Union stated that it would withdraw "the weapons which the United States classified as offensive" (Matveyev) or "the weapon, which the United States had qualified as an offensive one," (Chigir) from Cuba. Stating that the USSR "has observed and does observe" the 1962 agreement, Matveyev said it will continue to do so "provided the U.S. Government will also fulfill . . . its commitment regarding the invasion of Cuba." The article went on to say that Cuba also "maintains such a position." The TASS statement does not mention Cuba's attitude, nor does the Chigir commentary.

References to the 1962 Khrushchev-Kennedy agreement, an obvious propaganda liability for Moscow, have been virtually nonexistent in Soviet propaganda since Khrushchev's ouster. Khrushchev himself was the last top Soviet leader to mention it publicly, in a speech in Kalinin on 17 January 1964 when Castro was in Moscow. With the Cuban leader beside him on the rostrum, Khrushchev said the Soviet Union had emplaced and then removed its weapons, "but we received the promise then that there would be no invasion of Cuba, and we told the enemies of Cuba that if they tried it our rockets would not necessarily have to be in Cuba." The agreement with the government of the United States, he said, "remains in force today and we adhere to our promise while the agreement is observed." In the last elite Soviet reference to the agreement on record, trade union official Pimenov, speaking at a 24 July 1964 Moscow meeting marking a Cuban anniversary, cited a warning by Khrushchev that if Cuba were attacked "in violation of the U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba" the Soviet Union would provide the Cubans with "the necessary aid . . . by all the means at its disposal."

There has been no reference to a U.S. no-invasion pledge in any of the Soviet public statements over the past six years giving propaganda backing to Cuba in connection with exile attacks and incidents along the Guantanamo naval base perimeter. In available routine propaganda, the last--oblique--allusion to the 1962

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agreement on record appears in a PRAVDA UKRAINY article of 25 July 1969, by a doctor of historical sciences: "The international nature of defending socialist gains was shown with new force during the events in the Caribbean in the fall of 1962 when the U.S. imperialists were preparing to strangle the Cuban republic. They did not succeed because the Soviet armed forces and the armies of the Warsaw Pact member countries had been brought to a state of full combat-readiness."

POSITION ON FOREIGN BASES To the avowal that the Soviet Union adheres to the 1962 "understanding" and the argument that it violates no existing agreement when its ships call at Cuban ports, the TASS statement adds a reminder that the USSR "in general condemns the building of military bases on the territory of other states." Here TASS recalls that the USSR had advanced specific proposals in the United Nations and at the disarmament talks for the dismantling of foreign military bases. Radio Moscow reported on the 13th that the USSR's permanent mission had distributed the TASS statement at the United Nations.

The formal call for foreign-base liquidation--largely quiescent in Moscow's propaganda from mid-1962 until Khrushchev's ouster in October 1964--was revived in the 7 December 1964 Soviet memorandum on partial disarmament measures submitted by Gromyko to the UN General Assembly. A staple of the USSR's disarmament program since then, it is included in the most recent comprehensive package of partial measures offered by the USSR on 1 July 1968. Notably, Gromyko introduced a draft resolution "On the Elimination of Foreign Military Bases in the Countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America" in the course of his 23 September 1966 speech to the General Assembly. He called such bases legacies of colonialism serving as "springboards for aggression"; conceding that the liquidation of bases is no easy task, he argued that it would be "possible and feasible" to begin with bases on these three continents.

Matveyev's 10 October IZVESTIYA article anticipated the passage on the foreign base issue in the TASS statement, noting the USSR's unfavorable attitude toward the creation "by some states" of military bases on the territory of others but stopping short of recalling Soviet proposals to liquidate such bases. Unlike the statement, the article did recall Soviet proposals "on restricting the regions of missile submarine movements." The 1 July 1968 disarmament memorandum had included as its fourth point a call for a ban on the flights of nuclear-armed aircraft beyond national frontiers and for limitation of the zones of navigation of nuclear-armed submarines. Only infrequently men-

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tioned in routine Soviet comment, the proposal for limiting the navigational zones of nuclear-armed submarines last appeared at the elite level in the 17 June 1969 main document of the Moscow international party conference.

U.S. MOTIVES The TASS statement does not discourse at any length on U.S. motives for raising the issue, observing only that "the concocted clamor" about a Soviet base in Cuba "plays into the hands of those who are interested in fanning war psychosis and complicating the situation in that region of the world." The surrounding commentaries embellish this charge and add others.

Matveyev, carrying forward themes of the 30 September Ratiiani PRAVDA article, made elaborate efforts to impugn U.S. motives. Stressing that the U.S. press "propaganda" is related to a "Pentagon" effort to get Congress to approve large new military appropriations, he also linked the American press charges with "an effort to stir up the atmosphere in the Western hemisphere" in connection with the Chilean election outcome and said "they must also be linked with Washington's support for the Israeli ruling circles."

The Chigir TASS commentary is the only one so far to charge in so many words that the "propaganda furor" raised in the United States over the "nonexistent" Soviet base is contrived to justify "new provocations against Cuba" by presenting the USSR "as the 'violator' of the 1962 understanding between the United States and the USSR." The Matveyev article had seemed directed in part at Cuba in the wake of claims by Castro in recent months that President Nixon was sponsoring plans for an invasion of the island.* Stressing that the 1962 agreement involved a no-invasion commitment, Matveyev also noted that after assuming office President Nixon had "confirmed that the United States would not seek by force of arms or by military means to alter the situation existing on Cuba," nor would it permit Cuban exiles in the United States to do so. Observing that "no reasons" existed for "complication" of the situation in the Caribbean, he appeared to be suggesting that Cuba had abandoned involvement in foreign adventures in favor of concentrating on economic development when he stated that "the Republic of Cuba is directing its efforts toward the development of its own resources . . . and toward raising the working masses' standard of living."

* See the TRENDS of 2 September 1970, pages 34-35.

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HAVANA MEDIA STILL SILENT ON U.S. WARNING, SOVIET REACTION

Havana media have yet to acknowledge either the TASS statement or any of the Soviet commentaries on the subject. The sole monitored Cuban reaction to the U.S. warning remains a brief passage in a 1 October domestic radio commentary to the effect that the U.S. press "has been giving wide play to the submarine base that they say the Soviets are building in Cienfuegos."

Cuban leaders, frequently alleging that the United States is plotting an invasion of the island, have not brought up the subject of a U.S. no-invasion pledge in more than three years. On 22 July 1967, in the aftermath of Kosygin's visit to Cuba following the Glassboro meetings with President Johnson, Raul Castro cited AFP as reporting that State Department spokesman McCloskey had denied the existence of any agreement whereby the United States gave a no-invasion pledge in exchange for withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba, Khrushchev's version of the agreement notwithstanding. Remarking that every time "someone says there is a nonaggression agreement . . . McCloskey explains there is no agreement for nonaggression against Cuba," Castro concluded that this was proof that the United States is "interested in attacking" Cuba.

In his 26 July 1967 speech Fidel Castro referred to Raul's citation of McCloskey, declaring truculently: "What do we care whether or not they think that they have such a commitment! What we must ask is what right do they have to invade this country?" Both speeches came at a time when Soviet-Cuban relations were strained, and both references to a U.S. spokesman's denial of a no-invasion pledge prefaced calls for Cuban military self-reliance in the face of a U.S. invasion threat.

In an interview with K.S. Karol published in the French NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR on 20 September 1967, Fidel Castro was questioned about the existence of a 1962 U.S.-Soviet agreement whereby "the Americans promised not to attack Cuba." His reply clearly evinced dissatisfaction with the outcome of the missile crisis:

The Americans deny there is any such agreement. The crisis did not end in a victory for the socialist camp that would have allowed Moscow to impose conditions on Washington. On the contrary, we had to refuse to agree to any sort of control over Cuba to protect our revolution.

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Karol described Castro as "ironic" over Khrushchev's version of the missile crisis--that it resulted in a victory for the socialist camp because it assured the survival of the Cuban revolution. Reiterating a point made in his 26 July speech, Castro told Karol that Cuba's "sole shield against aggression" was its ability to defend itself and fight to the finish.

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BERLIN ISSUE

USSR REJECTS LINKAGE OF TREATY RATIFICATION WITH BERLIN ACCORD

A Radio Moscow commentary by Andreyev broadcast in German on 13 October, four days after the four-power ambassadors' latest session on Berlin, is notable for a rejection of "attempts to artificially interlock" the four-power talks on West Berlin with ratification of the FRG-Soviet treaty. Since the signing of the treaty on 12 August, Soviet propaganda has maintained a virtual silence on the idea of such a linkage, suggested at various times by Brandt and most recently brought up by Foreign Minister Scheel in remarks in the Bundestag on 9 October and in an interview published the following day in the BERLINER MORGENPOST.

Without mentioning the Brandt government, the Andreyev commentary says that attempts at such a linkage must be interpreted as an effort to "dictate some preconditions to the Soviet Union, with the objective of frustrating by one stroke both the ratification of the Soviet-West German treaty and the possibility of an agreement on West Berlin issues." It is obvious, Andreyev concludes, that these "futile" efforts cannot benefit either Soviet-West German relations or the West German people.

The commentary displays evident sensitivity to Western press reports that the USSR's position on the Berlin issue has stiffened since the 30 September meeting of the ambassadors on Berlin--the meeting at which Soviet Ambassador Abrasimov presented a position paper. Andreyev rejects the contention of the West German FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE that the four-power talks "are a new test for the peace readiness of the Soviet Union," arguing in rebuttal that the Soviet Union's "peace readiness" needs no proof. He goes on to insist that the USSR favors detente worldwide, including in West Berlin, and seeks the solution of "ripe" issues "on a sober and reasonable basis." Echoing a 4 October PRAVDA article, he attacks the CDU/CSU for alleged attempts to prevent an agreement on the West Berlin question.

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The position paper submitted by Abramimov on 30 September remains unacknowledged in Soviet comment. But a 5 October article in Warsaw's DZIENNIK LUDOWY, evincing optimism on the Berlin question, took note of the fact that for the first time since the talks started last winter "the USSR presented written proposals." The Polish paper commented that the conference "has left the stage of sounding out opinions and entered the stage of concrete study."

Soviet media have been treating the talks in low key. TASS reported without comment on 9 October that the ambassadors held their eighth session that day and would meet again early in November.

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POLAND AND WEST GERMANY

POLISH PROPAGANDA SUSTAINS LINE ON CONDITIONS FOR ACCORD

Polish propaganda on the sixth round of talks with West Germany balances cautious optimism about the possibility of a treaty normalizing relations between the two countries with continuing insistence on the need for the FRG to recognize the inviolability of the Oder-Neisse line. A 7 October PAP report of the communique on the talks, held in Bonn from 5 to 7 October, said that "since the negotiations are well advanced, it has been confirmed" that the Polish and FRG foreign ministers will meet in Warsaw in November. According to PAP, Foreign Minister Scheel is expected to arrive on 2 November. The sixth round of talks had been scheduled for early September but were delayed at Bonn's request. Polish propaganda at the time had concluded that the request for a delay seemed justified in view of the Brancz government's need to muster parliamentary support for an accord.*

ISSUE OF FRONTIER On the border question, an article in the Polish monthly NOWE DROGI, summarized by PAP on 9 October, said that "only" recognition of the Polish western frontiers as "final" and West German renunciation of all territorial claims on Poland "may be the point of departure" for a treaty between Warsaw and Bonn. A 28 September article in ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI recalled Gomulka's statements of 17 May 1969 and 6 September 1970 to the effect that "only the unequivocal and final recognition of the Oder-Neisse border and the FRG's renunciation of all territorial claims for today and for the future can be a foundation for normalization of relations."

Rejecting assertions by Foreign Minister Scheel--presumably his remarks in the Bundestag on the 9th--that all German border problems are the responsibility of the Big Four pending the conclusion of a peace treaty, a SLOWO POWSZECHNE article reviewed by PAP on the 13th says that such remarks by Scheel "on the eve of his arrival" in Warsaw "flabbergast" the Polish public. In the commentator's words, recognition of the

* For background, see the TRENDS for 16 September 1970, pages 31-32.

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inviolability of the frontiers is essential, and it would be illusory to expect from Warsaw "any departures or compromise."

MINORITY PROBLEM In addition to the border issue, Polish commentators have taken note of the problem of the German minority in Poland. An article in TRYBUNA LUDU on 5 October, for example, rejected the notion of a "German minority problem," stating that there is in fact a problem only of "a certain group of people" who have expressed a desire to emigrate to the FRG, largely for family reasons rather than from a "nationality feeling." In any case, the article said, the problem is an internal matter and cannot be the subject of intergovernmental talks. With normalization of relations progressing, the commentary concluded, the Polish authorities "may appropriately adjust these problems, but it is within their own discretion to do so."

PAP on the 8th quoted a subsequent article in TRYBUNA LUDU as stating that the West German press, in discussing the 5 October Polish article, "has firmly underlined that the problem of 'family reunion' was purely an internal affair of Poland." PAP went on to note that West German Government press spokesman Ahlers has indicated that the family reunion problem "was not a topic that would figure in a treaty between the two countries."

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POMPIDOU IN USSR

MOSCOW STRESSES POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF VISIT

French President Pompidou's widely publicized eight-day official visit to the Soviet Union culminated on 13 October in the signing--by Pompidou and Podgornyy--of two major documents: a purely political "protocol" pledging intensified consultations on specified international issues and a "declaration" noting areas of agreement on various European and world problems and expressing a mutual desire to develop political, economic, and cultural relations. Statements by Soviet leaders throughout the visit reflected primary concern with the political implications of the talks, while the French President's public comments put clear emphasis on the economic aspects.

Pompidou was given a high-level welcome and preferential treatment by Soviet officialdom. In addition to Podgornyy and Kosygin, Brezhnev greeted the French President at the airport and saw him off--an honor infrequently accorded foreign guests and one not extended to de Gaulle when he visited the USSR in June 1966. Accompanied by the Soviet triumvirate, Pompidou visited the Baykonur cosmodrome and was present, according to a Moscow domestic service broadcast, at the launching of an artificial earth satellite. De Gaulle had been the first Westerner to visit the space-launching center in 1966 and reportedly viewed the launching of an unmanned Cosmos satellite and an ICBM; Soviet media at that time, however, only briefly noted that he would visit the cosmodrome and did not indicate that he had witnessed the launches.

Throughout the visit, heavy stress was placed on traditional friendship and cooperation and on extensive agreement on current international and bilateral issues. Nevertheless, in some instances the existence of contentious issues was reflected in the leaders' public comments. In a 7 October luncheon speech, for example, Pompidou remarked that the rapid development of many-sided Soviet-French cooperation has resulted in "growing pains" and occasionally in "a lack of imagination or courage in certain spheres." He explained this as due not to an absence of good will but "of course" to "insufficient awareness of the realities in our two countries." He suggested that the remedy was increased exchanges. In apparent response in his address immediately following Pompidou's, Kosygin remarked that "naturally, in the course of the development of Soviet-French relations not everything succeeds immediately as one would have liked." He observed that "this is in the nature of things, and it reflects the features of the policies in each of our states." Kosygin added that Soviet-French collaboration and friend-

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ship is "immune to influences of outside forces, and in any turn of events they withstand a test of strength."

While Pompidou paid due respect in his speeches to the desirability of expanded political relations, his emphasis tended to be on development of economic relations. In his Kremlin speech on the 6th, for example, he said that "first of all" we should develop our economic and commercial exchanges, noting later that "we should also develop our political cooperation and turn it into a decisive factor of security on our continent." Podgorny on the same occasion asserted that "one should stress the importance of holding political consultations on questions of interest to both governments" and observed that "there is wide scope for our states to act as mutually trusting partners in the field of detente and strengthening European and world security."

Similar contrast was apparent in speeches, again in the Kremlin, on the 13th: Podgorny appeared to give pride of place to the protocol--"a very important document"--and devoted only one sentence to the declaration--"the other document." The TASS report of Podgorny's remarks on "the main results" of the talks stressed political cooperation to the virtual exclusion of economic issues, while Pompidou, in summing up his visit at the reception on the 13th, mentioned economic cooperation, cultural exchanges, the development of air and sea links, and the reciprocal establishment of consulates first. Only after that did he note that "finally, our conversations have led us to the conclusion that it is indispensable to strengthen cooperation between France and the Soviet Union in the political field," adding that he attached "the highest importance" to the agreement on political consultations.

Podgorny's emphasis on the political aspect was reinforced by Kosygin in a 7 October luncheon speech when he referred to "politics--the prime mover" of Soviet-French cooperation and asserted that "in widening and deepening the practice of political consultations, definite possibilities are created to raise Soviet-French political cooperation to a new, higher stage." He added that "we also see great significance in the development of economic and scientific-technical relations between our countries."

SOVIET-FRENCH PROTOCOL

The 13 October protocol, carried by TASS on that date, takes note of "the provisions and spirit of the declaration of 30 June 1966" and of both sides' firm resolve "to give a new impetus to their political cooperation." It calls for immediate political contact--with the aim of unifying action--on situations which "in the opinion of both sides would

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create a threat to peace, a violation of peace, or would cause international tension." In this connection, it mentions "developments in Europe," the "situations in all regions of the world where international security is threatened," topics of multilateral international talks in which both are interested, and "any other questions concerning which the sides may find it useful to have an exchange of views."

The protocol also stipulates that it does not affect any prior agreements with third parties and is not directed against any of them. It notes that political consultations shall be held "regularly" with the ministers of foreign affairs or their special representatives meeting "whenever necessary and, in principle, twice annually."

SOVIET-FRENCH The declaration touches on European security,
DECLARATION: disarmament, the Middle East, Indochina, and the
 United Nations, but the bulk of it is devoted to
Soviet-French relations with the emphasis--in contrast to the protocol--
overwhelmingly on trade and economic cooperation. There is only passing
reference to the development of cultural and political relations.

In general using the 1966 visit of de Gaulle as the takeoff point, the declaration notes with satisfaction the expansion of economic interchange and calls for further development of efforts to stimulate trade, particularly French imports of Soviet commodities. It envisages negotiations for major long-term contracts related to "the development of new mineral deposits" and suggests that these might lead to "preferential cooperation" between the two countries. Both sides agreed, according to the declaration, to promote the implementation of major industrial projects "the scale of which will call, in some cases, for cooperation among several European countries." It records agreement to open a Soviet general consulate in Marseilles and a French general consulate in Leningrad.

Although the declaration does not mention the protocol, it says that both sides attached "great importance to consultations between both governments on basic international issues" and that satisfaction with the results of such consultations in the past four years led to a decision "to make these consultations even more consistent and comprehensive."

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UNITED NATIONS

MOSCOW PRESSES ITS PROPOSAL ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

Early Soviet reportage and comment on the 25th session of the UN General Assembly, which opened 15 September, has underscored the importance of Assembly action on the Soviet Government's draft proposal on measures to strengthen international security. In addition, there are standard calls for deliberations on liquidating the "dangerous hotbeds" of war in the Middle East and Indochina and consolidating European security. In urging progress on disarmament, the propaganda advocates prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons and total demilitarization of the world's seabeds, the main issues of discussion at the recently concluded session of the Geneva disarmament talks. While Moscow refrains from comment on the U.S.-Soviet strategic arms limitation talks, scheduled to resume in Helsinki on 2 November, its reportage on the UNGA session takes note of favorable references to SALT by such spokesmen as British Foreign Secretary Home.

The item on strengthening international security, based on a Soviet proposal formally submitted at last year's session, is included in the current session's agenda as a carryover item. The Soviet proposal outlined a number of steps toward this end, including the withdrawal of troops from foreign territories, cessation of all measures designed to suppress "national liberation movements," establishment of regional security systems, and agreement on a generally acceptable definition of aggression and on UN peace-keeping operations. Noting that the question is now under consideration in the UNGA's first committee, Moscow says the discussion is centered on a draft declaration sponsored by the USSR and seven other socialist countries. Soviet propaganda has routinely cited UNGA speakers' comments on the urgent need to strengthen international security and has claimed that widespread support for the Soviet proposal in the past year indicates that UN members attach primary importance to this question.

Recent propaganda has been at pains to discredit a draft resolution on the subject--also before the first committee--proposed by a number of Western delegations. In Moscow's first comment on the Western draft, PRAVDA's UN correspondents

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said on 2 October that remarks were already being heard in UN corridors to the effect that this draft "passes over in silence a number of important principles of the UN Charter" while playing up "less essential precepts" and belittling the role and importance of the Security Council. Moscow's reports have publicized Soviet speakers' contentions in the first committee that the Western draft is vaguely worded and lacks concrete provisions on such issues as colonialism, foreign military occupation, and suppression of "liberation movements," in contrast to the "unambiguous" and "concrete" program advanced by the socialist countries.

On the 8th TASS took note without comment of a draft resolution on the issue submitted by Brazil on behalf of 22 Latin American countries.

SOVIETS URGE SEATING OF GDR, DOWNPLAY PRC MEMBERSHIP ISSUE

While Soviet media recurrently point to the importance of the universality of the United Nations and the "urgency" of seating the GDR, references to seating of the Peking regime are few and far between. Moscow's domestic service reported on 17 September that the UN General Committee had by majority vote "retained the question of restoring the legitimate rights of the PRC in the United Nations on the agenda," and a 4 October Moscow broadcast to Chinese listeners observed that "now the Chinese leaders are seemingly expressing their concern for the restoration of China's legal right in the United Nations." However, the 19 September TASS report on the previous day's UNGA speeches ignored both the Peruvian delegate's reference to the absence of the PRC and French Foreign Minister Schumann's press conference remarks citing reasons for believing Peking hopes for a positive UNGA vote on the seating question.

The Byelorussian representative, in remarks publicized by TASS on 30 September, argued that seating the GDR would "contribute to the universality" of the United Nations but did not mention the PRC. Similarly, a panelist in the Radio Moscow commentators' roundtable on 4 October, remarking that "it is essential that the delegates' tables be occupied by representatives of all states, including those presently outside the organization who have a right to be in it," pointed to the "urgency" of seating both German states but did not mention the Chinese seat.

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WARSAW PACT

FIRST EXERCISE OF "ALL" PACT ARMIES OPENS IN EAST GERMANY

Moscow and its Warsaw Pact allies announced the opening of the "Comradeship in Arms" maneuvers in East Germany on the 13th, bringing together units of all the Pact states in such an exercise for the first time in Pact history. Major propaganda fanfare for the maneuvers has been enhanced by the coincidence of the GDR's 21st anniversary, falling on 7 October, and of Czechoslovak and Polish army anniversaries.

Where Pact exercises are normally announced either shortly before they begin or just after they have ended, this one was first announced by ADN almost a month in advance, in a brief 15 September report that they would be held "on GDR territory this autumn in accordance with the plan of the Warsaw Pact united forces command." East Berlin media announced on 30 September that GDR Defense Minister Hoffmann would direct the maneuvers. The fact that Romanian troops would participate was not announced until 3 October, when ADN reported their arrival by train in Dresden. Only thereafter did TASS, on the 5th, enumerate the seven Pact armies "now arriving in the exercise area." While Romania has not so far commented, Moscow and all the other Pact allies have since been hailing the participation of "all seven" member states.

The advance comment describes the "Comradeship in Arms" exercise as the largest in the fall series that has included "October Storm" (October 1965), "Vltava" (September 1966), and "Oder-Neisse" (September 1969). The "Oder-Neisse" exercises, in which the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the GDR took part, had been localized in western Poland. The present maneuvers are said to cover the whole territory of the GDR as well as the Baltic and to involve Soviet, East German, and Polish naval units. ADN on the 12th, reporting the arrival of Pact military leaders for the exercises, mentioned the arrival also of Cuban Defense Minister Raul Castro and DRV Deputy Defense Minister Major General Tran Sam.

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While most of the comment has emphasized the unprecedented scope of the maneuvers, a dispatch in Bratislava PRAVDA on 7 October pictures them as routine fall exercises which regularly cap the training undertaken by Pact armies during the year, ascribing the full participation this time to the fact that this is the Pact's "15th anniversary year." The anniversary was celebrated in May.

ROMANIAN PARTICIPATION This is the first time Romanian units have taken part in a regular Pact exercise in a foreign country other than Bulgaria or the USSR since April 1962, when they went to Hungary. In October 1962 Romania hosted a joint exercise with Soviet and Bulgarian troops, and in May 1969 TASS reported the participation of Romanian ground forces in an exercise in the USSR along with Soviet, Bulgarian, and Hungarian troops.

ADN on the 11th reported Pact commander Yakubovskiy as telling the participating Romanian staff, in a welcoming speech, that the current exercise would "once again show the high military training and cohesion of the socialist armies" and "strengthen the combat comradeship among the soldiers of the socialist countries." East German accounts of the first day's operations put special stress on the "united action" and "coordination" between the Romanian elements and other Pact forces. Romania sent Army Chief of Staff Colonel General Gheorghe for the maneuvers; Hungary also sent its Chief of Staff, General Csemi, while all the others sent defense ministers.

ALBANIAN ATTACK An article in the Tirana BASHKIMI on 12 October, publicized by ATA, brackets "the recent military exercises of the U.S. imperialists and of the Soviet social imperialists." The NATO "Northern Wedding" and Warsaw Pact "Comradeship in Arms" maneuvers, the paper charges, follow logically in the wake of the Soviet-FRG treaty which exemplifies Soviet "support" for "the German militarists." Through the respective maneuvers, "the Moscow and Washington chiefs want to intimidate the European peoples" and to "persuade the vassals in their respective blocs to be quiet and accept their dictates," BASHKIMI says.

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ALBANIA

HOXHA DEFENDS, MOSCOW DEPLORES TIRANA'S FOREIGN POLICY COURSE

Albanian party chief Hoxha, in a mammoth, wide-ranging election speech published in ZERI I POPULLIT on 19 September, was at pains to emphasize that Tirana's more outgoing foreign policy does not indicate any lessening of revolutionary militancy or signal any reconciliation with the present Soviet leadership. "We stand for and actively struggle for revolution," he declared, "and we will never renounce the political and ideological struggle to defend our victories and Marxism-Leninism on a national and international platform."

Albania's recent establishment of diplomatic relations with the Scandinavian countries and its willingness to establish similar ties with the Latin American countries,* Hoxha defensively insisted, "do not involve a turning point" or any "concessions" in Albanian policy. Repeating the formulation that Albania is ready to develop "correct" cultural and trade ties with states having differing social systems provided they respect Albanian sovereignty, he went on to pledge that "all those imperialist and revisionist states" that are "hostile to us" have been and "always will be rebuffed." In this context he labeled the United States "the main and most savage enemy" of the peoples and the Soviet Union "another enemy no less dangerous and savage." The only direct mention of Yugoslavia came in a passage attacking the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia: Hoxha noted that "threats of invasion were also made to Romania, Yugoslavia, and Albania."

Hoxha suggested, without revealing any specifics, that there have been overtures to Albania from Moscow. He stated that the Soviets, after failing to intimidate the Albanians, "are now asking for the polemics to cease, the restoration of

* In the aftermath of the Soviet bloc intervention in Czechoslovakia and in parallel with China's currently more flexible foreign policy, Albania has been quietly improving relations with Romania as well as with the "revisionist" Yugoslavs. It has also been demonstrating renewed interest in developing relations with such countries as Greece and Syria.

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trade relations, and the establishment of diplomatic relations." Answering a rhetorical question allegedly being asked by Moscow, "What Marxists are you that trade with the capitalist countries and do not trade with us?", Hoxha answered: "You are renegades, you are among the worst capitalists, . . . and do not forget you have great debts toward Albania--political, ideological, and economic . . ., and you should well know that we will never give you even a drop of water even when you are on your deathbed." He added that "this stand of ours is fully Marxist" because by opposing Soviet revisionism, "revolution and communism win."

Perhaps with Peking's current propaganda standdown vis-a-vis Moscow in mind, Hoxha went on to expatiate on the need to continue polemics with the Soviets. Since the days of Khrushchev, he said, the Soviets have been trying to get the Albanian party to cease polemics, but it has not fallen for this "maneuver," which was designed to "conceal the betrayal of the renegades and assist their tactics and strategy." In a later section of the speech, Hoxha returned to the necessity to "expose and fight" the Brezhnev-Kosygin "clique": "It should once more be forcefully said and reaffirmed that by this you [the Albanian people] do the greatest internationalist service to the peoples of the Soviet Union and to the genuine Soviet-Marxist revolutionaries, whom we do not confuse with the revisionists."

NEW TIMES In what may be a reaction to Hoxha's hostile speech,
ARTICLE an article entitled "Albania and the Outside World"
 in the Soviet weekly NEW TIMES No. 40, signed to the
press on 2 October, assails Tirana for its "anti-Soviet and pro-Chinese policies." NEW TIMES says that "in Peking's wake, Tirana is turning increasingly to the capitalist West, which in turn is showing considerable interest in this Balkan country." It goes on to cite Greek press reports that Albanian trade talks have taken place in Athens and adds that "a representative of the American Standard Oil Company" was reportedly present.

The article also notes that the Albanian leadership has taken "a negative attitude" toward such steps to ease international tensions as the treaty between Moscow and Bonn. Remarking that the Soviet people are "saddened" by such Albanian attitudes, the article states that the USSR "invariably supported and still supports the normalization of relations between our countries."

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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

DIVERGENT TREATMENT OF BREZHNEV AT BAKU CEREMONIAL

A comparison of speeches by leaders of republic party organizations at the 2 October celebration of the Azerbaydzhan 50th anniversary with speeches at similar anniversary ceremonies in the Ukraine, Belorussia, and Kazakhstan indicates that Brezhnev has gained in open expressions of support, especially by Central Asian leaders. There remain notable holdouts, however, as Brezhnev continues to be ignored or slighted by the leaders of the RSFSR, the Ukraine, Belorussia, Estonia, Georgia, and Leningrad.

At the Azerbaydzhan ceremony, as at the Kazakh ceremony in August, Brezhnev was treated much more favorably than at the December 1967 Ukrainian and December 1968 Belorussian anniversaries. Azerbaydzhan First Secretary G.A. Aliyev lavishly praised Brezhnev in his introductory and closing speeches, and his keynote report repeatedly addressed thanks to the Central Committee, the Soviet Government, and "you personally, Leonid Ilich." In an unusual compliment to a local leader, Brezhnev praised Aliyev's report as "remarkable" (in the live broadcast; the adjective was deleted from published versions).

The Central Asian leaders present also joined in conspicuous praise of Brezhnev. Sh. R. Rashidov, Uzbek First Secretary and Politburo candidate member, noted that Brezhnev was "warmly loved among the people," and he devoted much of his brief address to praising Brezhnev's "brilliant, exciting" speech in Baku and his "brilliant, inspiring" speech in Uzbekistan in early September (BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY, 3 October). Rashidov's speech at a recent Uzbek Central Committee plenum was also replete with praise of Brezhnev (PRAVDA VOSTOKA, 26 September). Rashidov's republic issued an edition of Brezhnev's two-volume works in Uzbek, joining Kazakhstan and Azerbaydzhan as the only republics to have produced local translations thus far (PRAVDA, 29 September).

By contrast, Rashidov had ignored Brezhnev or mentioned him without comment at the Ukrainian and Belorussian ceremonies. At the Kazakh ceremony last August he was mildly complimentary, making a reference to Brezhnev's "remarkable" speech.

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Tadzhik First Secretary D.R. Rasulov lyricized about Brezhnev's "personal charm" and the inspiration of his recent visit to Tadzhikistan. He had followed Rashidov's example at the Ukrainian and Belorussian anniversaries and had called Brezhnev's speech "brilliant" at the Kazakh ceremony.

Kirgiz First Secretary T.U. Usubaliyev, like Kunayev and Grishin at the Kazakh ceremony and Aliyev at the Azerbaydzhan ceremony, called Brezhnev an "outstanding" leader of the world communist movement. Again like Kunayev and Aliyev, he stated that Brezhnev "heads" the Central Committee. Usubaliyev has been consistently complimentary, having called Brezhnev's speech "remarkable" in Belorussia and "brilliant and deeply profound" in Kazakhstan (he did not attend the Ukrainian anniversary). The Central Asians' increased enthusiasm for Brezhnev presumably stems from his August-September tour of Central Asian capitals.

Others at the Baku ceremony limited themselves to characterizing Brezhnev's speech as "brilliant" (Kazakh First Secretary D.A. Kunayev, Turkmen First Secretary M.G. Gapurov, and Moscow city executive committee chairman V.F. Promyslov) or "remarkable" (Latvian Premier Yu. Ya. Ruben).

On the other hand, Brezhnev received neither praise nor any special attention from new Leningrad First Secretary G.V. Romanov, Georgian First Secretary and Politburo candidate member V.P. Mzhavanadze, Lithuanian First Secretary A. Yu. Sniechkus or Armenian First Secretary A. Ye. Kochinyan, even though Kochinyan had openly displayed his allegiance to Brezhnev at the Kazakh ceremony. Moreover, Ukrainian First Secretary P. Ye. Shelest, RSFSR First Deputy Premier A.M. Shkolnikov, Belorussian President S.O. Pritytskiy, and Estonian First Secretary I.G. Kebin completely ignored Brezhnev in their speeches.

RESISTANCE TO PRAISING BREZHNEV	Some leaders have shown considerable reluctance to compliment Brezhnev at these ceremonies. Estonian First Secretary Kebin has the most consistent record: he failed even to mention Brezhnev's speeches on all four occasions. Leningrad's representatives--city First Secretary G.I. Popov in the Ukraine, former oblast First Secretary V.S. Tolstikov in Belorussia, city executive committee chairman A.A. Sizov in Kazakhstan, and new oblast First Secretary Romanov in
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Azerbaijani--have never praised Brezhnev. Azerbaijani's purged first secretary, V. Yu. Akhundov, failed to praise Brezhnev in the Ukraine and Belorussia, but his successor Aliyev ardently lauded Brezhnev at the Kazakh and Azerbaijani ceremonies.

Others have shown less consistency in their reluctance to compliment Brezhnev. Georgian First Secretary and Politburo candidate member Mzhavanadze has largely ignored Brezhnev, except in his Kazakh speech when he stated that a particular idea was "brilliantly and clearly stressed" in Brezhnev's speech. Belorussian First Secretary and Politburo candidate member P.M. Masherov complimented Brezhnev's speech at the December 1967 Ukrainian anniversary, but he failed to do so at his own republic's December 1968 ceremony. Belorussian Premier T. Ya. Kiselev, representing Belorussia in Kazakhstan, and President Pritytskiy, representing Belorussia in Azerbaijan, ignored Brezhnev's speeches.

In some instances representatives from particular republics have differed in their behavior. The clearest case is the Ukraine, where First Secretary Shelest ignored Brezhnev or mentioned him without comment at the Ukrainian, Belorussian, and Azerbaijani anniversary celebrations. On the other hand, Ukrainian President A.P. Lyashko, representing the Ukraine in Kazakhstan, described Brezhnev's speech as "remarkable." Voronov, representing the RSFSR in the Ukraine and Belorussia, and his deputy and protege Shkolnikov, representing the RSFSR in Azerbaijan, ignored Brezhnev's speeches; but RSFSR President M.A. Yasnov, not a Voronov protege, praised Brezhnev's speech as "remarkable" when he represented the RSFSR in Kazakhstan.

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